^{FN1 Ch14} It came about this way. At the beginning of 1813, Warren wrote expressing his view that his command was stretched, in that it went geographically from the North Atlantic to the Caribbean. The West Indies, Warren suggested, should be under a separate command, so that he could concentrate his efforts on the American seaboard. At the time, the Admiralty disagreed, thinking the better strategy was for all of it to remain under a single command. In gearing up for the 1814 campaign, the British overseers decided to set up separate commands, seemingly in agreement with Warren's earlier suggestion. The North Atlantic, Jamaica, and the Leeward Islands were to be separated. They then advised Warren that he was too senior to have the command of just one of these stations. Taking the matter for what it really was, that the Admiralty did not want him in command for the 1814 campaign, Warren, infused with bitterness, went into retirement. The fact of the matter is, John Borlase Warren had an illustrious career. It is just that his last game was not up to expectations. His failure in the Chesapeake during 1813 should not be put down to his incompetence. The author of the DCB entry, wrote: "Unfortunately for Warren, the force at his disposal always lacked ships, seamen, provisions, and stores, even after reinforcements arrived. His incessant requests probably irritated the Admiralty, and he was reprimanded for them by its secretary, John Wilson Croker. Yet Warren’s vessels had to blockade the main American ports from New York City south, watch and restrain scores of privateers, be alert for forays by the American frigates and sloops, guard the convoys from Jamaica to Quebec, protect Halifax and Bermuda, and carry out raids on the coasts of Chesapeake and Delaware bays." (Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online: http://www.biographi.ca/).

^{FN2 Ch14} Sir Edward Codrington (1770–1851) was joined to Cochrane as his chief of staff.

^{FN3 Ch14} Cochrane to Bathurst, as set out by Mahan in Sea Power in its Relations to The War of 1812 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1905), Vol. 2, pp. 330-1.

^{FN4 Ch14} Mahan: "In the first six months of 1814, the warfare in the Chesapeake continued on the same general lines as in 1813; there having been the usual remission of activity during the winter, to resume again as milder weather drew on." (Sea Power in its Relations to The War of 1812 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1905), Vol. 2, p. 336.)

^{FN5 Ch14} Mahan in Sea Power in its Relations to The War of 1812 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1905), Vol. 2, p. 340.

^{FN6 Ch14} A battalion of seven hundred marines who were attached to the navel ships were to join the 3,400 soldiers that had come in from Bermuda.

^{FN7 Ch14} Hannay, "The War of 1812," NSHS, #11 (1901) p. 376.

^{FN8 Ch14} Cockburn had information "that Commodore Barney, with the Potomac flotilla, had taken shelter at the head of the Patuxent ..." (See Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to The War of 1812, Vol. 2, p. 341.) Your compiler is not sure why it is that a flotilla of gun boats meant for the Potomac was at the head of the Patuxent. The gunboats the Americans were using, and which fits the usual understanding of the term, were floating platforms with a number of cannon set up on it. These gunboats were usually moored in a fixed position on the water near that facility on the shore which was to be defended. They were not very effective against warships which were maneuverable by oar or by wind.

^{FN9 Ch14} "Seeing the inevitable event, and to preserve his small but valuable force of men, Barney had abandoned the boats on the 21st, leaving with each a half-dozen of her crew to destroy her at the last moment. This was done when the British next day approached ..." (Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to The War of 1812, Vol. 2, p. 344.) Hannay writes ["The War of 1812," NSHS, #11 (1901) p. 377] that the "aggregate crews of this flotilla numbered about 700 men." The order for the destruction of the American gunboats came from Washington, in order to free up Barney's men for the defense of the capital.

^{FN10 Ch14} William H. Winder (1775-1824) had been one of two commanders at the Battle of Stoney Creek in July 1813, where he had been captured. Having been exchanged, he was appointed commander of the defenses of Washington and Baltimore.

^{FN11 Ch14} Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to The War of 1812 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1905), Vol. 2, p. 350.

^{FN12 Ch14} Hannay writes of this: "Not a moment was lost in making an attack upon the strongly posted enemy [Americans]. The British attacking force was in two columns, the right consisting of 750 rank and file ... led by Col. Brooke [of the 44th Regt.], and the left composed of ... 800 men, under Colonel Thornton. ... Once over the river, Captain Brooke's column instantly stormed the six gun battery, and captured three of the six pounders ... The entire body of riflemen on both flanks of the battery, after one or two fires, fled. Thus was the first line disposed of. Colonel Brooke's little column now advanced against the American second line, which numbered 2,400 men, or more than three-fold his force." ["The War of 1812," NSHS, #11 (1901) pp. 382-3.]

^{FN13 Ch14} Mahan in Sea Power in its Relations to The War of 1812 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1905), Vol. 2, p. 348. Hannay reported the same numbers for the British (64 killed, 185 wounded) but reported the American loss at 26 killed and 51 wounded. The American losses were small by either count. The American losses were small, as Hannay explained, because they "fled from the field with such alacrity." ["The War of 1812," NSHS, #11 (1901) p. 384.]

^{FN14 Ch14} Sea Power in its Relations to The War of 1812 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1905), Vol. 2, pp. 348-9.

^{FN15 Ch14} The President, his cabinet, and many other government officials fled to the mountains of Virginia. Washington was of little strategic value, it being but a small port with about 8,000 inhabitants, of which 1,300 were slaves. Washington was only of symbolic value, and its capture and burning was but a favour returned for the American raid on York (Toronto) on April 27th, 1813, when the Americans looted and burned buildings, including the governor's house and the provincial legislative building.

^{FN16 Ch14} As one of my readers has pointed out: the White House still shows the scorch marks of the fire. The President's wife Dolly Madison is given credit for rescuing various documents of state and a Gilbert Stuart portrait of Washington.

^{FN17 Ch14} The Americans themselves set fire to the Navy Yard and to the frigate, Columbia, 44, and sloop, Argus, 18, which were nearly ready for service. A prodigious amount of ammunition in the magazines was blown up and a vast quantity of stores of every description destroyed. [Hannay, "The War of 1812," NSHS, #11 (1901) p. 386.]

^{FN18 Ch14} Rear-Admiral Cockburn in his report on the operation, and as is quoted by Mahan in Sea Power in its Relations to The War of 1812 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1905), Vol. 2, p. 349.

^{FN19 Ch14} Seahorse (38) and Euryalus (36) were the two frigates. [See "The War of 1812," Hannay NSHS, #11 (1901) p. 377.] There were numerous smaller support ships including, as Hannay wrote, "three bomb vessels and a rocket ship ...."

^{FN20 Ch14} "Thus, when the militia retreated to the Virginia countryside and Captain Dyson, commander of Ft. Washington, blew up the fortress, Alexandria's fate was sealed." ( http://oha.ci.alexandria.va.us/archaeology/decades/ar-decades-1810.html : 8/16/2006.) "... fort commander Capt. Samuel Dyson evacuated his men and detonated the fort's powder to keep it out of enemy hands. Dyson was later court-martialed for abandoning the fort." ( http://www.rudyalicelighthouse.net/MdAtLts/FtWash/FtWsh.htm : 8/16/2006.) Mahan was to observe that the occupation of the Chesapeake and the destruction of Washington was a lesson of the dangers incurred when the approaches to waterways are not defended. [The Influence of Seapower Upon History (London: Sampson Low, nd [c1889]), p.31.]

^{FN21 Ch14} "Captain Gordon [James Gordon, the commander of the British squadron] offered terms which called for the removal of naval supplies, ships and agricultural commodities from the port. At the mercy of the British squadron, the town council acceded to the enemy's demands, and for the next five days the British looted stores and warehouses of 16,000 barrels of flour, 1,000 hogsheads of tobacco, 150 bales of cotton and some $5,000 worth of wine, sugar and other items. On September 2, the British weighed anchor and, after a skirmish with American forces at White House Landing below Mount Vernon, they made their escape." (http://oha.ci.alexandria.va.us/archaeology/decades/ar-decades-1810.html : 8/16/2006.)

^{FN22 Ch14} Hannay, "The War of 1812," NSHS, #11 (1901) p. 387.

^{FN23 Ch14} From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Ross_%28general%29 The author continues: "According to Baltimore tradition, two American riflemen, teenagers Daniel Wells and Henry McComas, aged 18 and 19, respectively, were credited with killing Ross; both were killed in the engagement." Ross died while being transported back to the ships. His body was, à la Nelson, stored in a barrel of rum and shipped on the HMS Royal Oak to Halifax. On September 29th, Ross was interred at St. Paul's Churchyard, or as it is sometimes referred to, "The Old Burying Ground." It is a place on Barrington Street just opposite the Georgian mansion which has been occupied by a succession of Lieutenant Governors of Nova Scotia to-date and since before the War of 1812. "The Old Burying Ground," incidentally, it is not only the final resting place of Major General Sir Robert Ross but also of many heroes of the War of 1812.

^{FN24 Ch14} Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to The War of 1812 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1905), Vol. 2, p. 351.

^{FN25 Ch14} As one of my readers advised: "As the ships were beyond the range of their cannons, a continuous, but ultimately ineffective, 25-hour bombardment, employing the much less accurate mortars and Congreve rockets, rained down upon Fort McHenry on Locus Point, treating the locals to a spectacular display of pyrotechnics during the night of the 13th-24th." It was during this bombardment of the fort that Francis Scott Key was inspired to write The Star-Spangled Banner, the poem that would eventually be turned into the national anthem of the United States.
"Oh, say can you see, by the dawn's early light,
What so proudly we hailed at the twilight's last gleaming?
Whose broad stripes and bright stars, through the perilous fight,
O'er the ramparts we watched, were so gallantly streaming?
And the rockets' red glare, the bombs bursting in air,
Gave proof through the night that our flag was still there.
O say, does that star-spangled banner yet wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave?"

^{FN26 Ch14} Mahan, Sea Power in its Relations to The War of 1812 (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1905), Vol. 2, p. 351.

^{FN27 Ch14} Figures set out by Hannay, "The War of 1812," NSHS, #11 (1901) p. 391.